Dealing with the Russians and snubbing the Poles

When looking over the UN summit and the great G20 conference swamping Pittsburgh at the moment, I'll turn my focus to the foreign policy issues being discussed. Despite the more entertaining elements of the climate change debate and the ever "interesting" stump speaking of Libyan dictator Mommar Khaddafy and the Iranian Prime Minister *unspellable* Ahmini-*unpronouncable*, the present issue on my mind is the Administration's questionable (in my mind) response to any foreign quibble with American policy being to apologize for whatever perceived past wrong we've inflicted and to remedy it through some unilateral concession. The issue this week that caused some stir of course was the decision to remove the missile shield programs placed in the Czech Republic and Poland, seemingly as a way to appease the Russian disagreements with our placing a missile shield against Iran or other possible threats, in their former vassal states. To me this argument by the Russians would be more valid if it were any of the former subject states of the Russian Empire proper (Poland having been continually partitioned during that period) such as the Ukraine or the Baltic States. However, the Poles have good reason for seeking our protection based on that country's unfortunate history and it seems wrong, considering their and the Czechs' support of our policies in recent years, to throw them under the bus against their governments' wishes, in a public manner.



Though the Administration stated that the removal of the missile defense system is one meant to save costs and will be more efficiently pursued from Naval-based platforms, particularly (in a case with Iran's nuclear arm, in the Persian Gulf) The public nature of the program seems keyed more towards appeasing the Russians in a manner to make their foreign policy more friendly towards our aims. That their President Dmitry Medvedev implied Russian "might" be more favorably disposed towards sanctions toward Iran in certain circumstances. I'm skeptical of any Russian policy statement that does not clearly include Vladimir Putin, presently the Prime Minister. If the conduct of Russia's "short victorious war abroad" in the Republic of Georgia in 2008 is any indication, Putin is still largely in charge of foreign affairs from a functional standpoint. It was Putin meeting with and dispatching Russian generals to the front at the time, and it seems unlikely that he would take any unilateral concession from the United States as sign to put more pressure on Iran than he was already willing to. This is the Russian government that seems to endorse the murder of opposition journalists by para-military thugs and maintain foreign policy as a zero-sum game.

Part of my justification for this is that the Russians ALWAYS have seen foreign policy as a zero sum game, dating back centuries. When diplomat and Russian history expert George Kennan wrote his famous "Long Telegram" from Moscow in 1946, he stated essentially that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was essentially that of the Russian Empire writ-large--- expand into Eastern Europe and maintain a buffer of states as guard against any future aggression or perceived threat. In Russia's subsequent history I see no reason to change that assumption, that Russia's policy is that of the Soviet Union from a weakened standpoint-- as Russia's situation improves somewhat under the admittedly very competent government of Putin and his allies, they will continue to try and exercise a level of control over their former subject states-- the Baltic states, Ukraine, and possibly farther West. I fear all this removal of the missile shield in such a public manner has accomplished is to discourage Eastern Europe from siding with the West in disputes that risk the disfavor of the Russians. It may also embolden the Russians to feel they've a free hand in their former sphere of influence.